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FINANCIAL INABILITY
TO OBTAIN AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE
Taylor Mattis*
"Giving practical application to a great ideal is one of man's most
rewarding satisfactions."
William H. Timbers, Chief Judge, United States District Court,
District of Connecticut*
I. INTRODUCTION
The factual necessity for the guiding hand of counsel at every
step of a criminal proceeding is undisputed and well accepted by
lawyers and laymen in our society. Perhaps the most eloquent
statement of that necessity is Justice Sutherland's in Powell v.
Alabama::'
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law .... He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. 2
The fountainhead of the legal requirement for court appointed
counsel is Powell, holding that the right to be provided counsel is
under some circumstances part of due process that every state
owes its citizens. Six years later, Johnson v. ZerbstO defined the
dimensions of this constitutional obligation for federal courts.
Gideon v. Wainwright,4 a quarter of a century later, defined the
dimensions of the constitutional obligation for the states. The his-
tory is a living one, and there are many questions, outside the scope
of this study, which remain unanswered as to the right to ap-
pointed counsel.5 Taking the factual necessity and the legal require-
* A.B. University of Alabama, 1960; J.D. University of Miami, 1963;
LL.M. Yale University, 1969; Member Florida Bar.
** Timbers, The Criminal Justice Act: A Lawyer's Call to Duty, 39 CoNN.
B.J. 427, 438 (1965).
1 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2 Id. at 68-69.
3 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
4 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5 For example, when does the constitutional right end--after appeal
or only after certiorari is denied or the case determined by the
Supreme Court? Under what circumstances does the right apply in
post conviction proceedings? Does the right attach in a criminal pro-
ceeding such as a misdemeanor, or violation of a municipal ordinance?
Should the right be extended to civil proceedings?
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ments for a lawyer as established, this study focuses upon the duties
of the court to appoint and of the taxpayers to pay for the defense
of an accused in a criminal proceeding. What financial circum-
stances of an accused trigger these duties? A general approach to
the determination of the issues is utilized as opposed to a state-by-
state or purely federal analysis, although federal practice is empha-
sized.
Two philosophical points need to be stated concerning society's
duty to pay. First, it is society as a whole, not the defendant indi-
vidually, that has selected the modified adversary system under
which we operate. Our choice of the mechanism for determining
criminal responsibility, rather than some notion of benevolence or
gratuity to the poor, requires that both sides have professional
spokesmen who know the rules.6 Some suggest that it is appropriate
to regard counsel for the defense as a part of the mechanism by
which society operates the criminal process.7 Under the system in
some Scandinavian countries every defendant is provided counsel
at state expense regardless of his poverty or wealth, subject to his
right to retain counsel privately if he prefers.8 Although this posi-
tion might be reached ultimately, current priorities as well as
contemporary ideas of fairness are best satisfied by a solution some-
where between a public defense bar completely supported by the
state, like the prosecution, and a lawyer-only-if-defendant-can-
afford-one concept.
Second, it is the duty of society, not just that of the bar, to bear
the expense. No group or classification of persons should bear dis-
proportionate economic loss in the operation of government. Those
costs should be borne by all people equally and equitably. For far
6 A.B.A. PROJECT ON IINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVIcES-TENTATIVE DRAFT
3 (1967). "No one can guarantee that the particular lawyer repre-
senting one side will be professionally the equal of the other; what
is important is that the system for providing counsel and facilities
for the defense be as good as the system which society provides for
the prosecution." Id. at 1.
7 Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law,
41 F.R.D. 389, 397 (1967). The extreme of this theory is undesirable
and conceivably could raise issues of due process. The traditional
lawyer-client relationship could be replaced by one between the
client, advised by a lawyer, and the system. The extreme is reflected
in the notion that when counsel is retained any lack of skill on his
part is imputed to the client, whereas in assigned counsel cases the
negligence or ineptitude is imputed to the state. See Polur, Retained
Counsel, Assigned Counsel: Why the Dichotomy?, 55 A.B.A.J. 254
(1969).
8 Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law,
41 F.R.D. 389, 396 (1967).
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too long the entire financial burden of defending poor persons and
even of paying their expenses fell onto the shoulders of too small
a segment of the population-namely the lawyers.9 The standard of
compensation for appointed counsel is still lower than for retained
counsel."'
Why should we not adopt an "ask and you shall receive" stand-
ard? The position has been taken that any defendant who can afford
his own lawyer will retain him, since he knows he will get better
representation that way." If this premise were accurate, it would
9 The government was not liable for the fees of counsel assigned to
defend a capital case under 18 U.S.C. § 3005. Nabb v. United States, 1
Ct. Cl. 173 (1864). No provision was made for payment to counsel
assigned to defend an accused in the federal courts until the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A [hereinafter cited as CJA].
There are still no provisions for compensation to counsel appointed
in "civil" proceedings to represent a petitioner for habeas corpus
or for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (post conviction relief in the
nature of coram nobis). 18 U.S.C. § 3006A is set out in an appendix to
this article.
In Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962), a prisoner
convicted of armed robbery of a federally insured bank sought § 2255
relief on the ground that he had been induced by an assistant United
States attorney to plead guilty. The district court had ordered a hear-
ing, but denied Dillon's request for appointment of counsel. The Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded,
holding that counsel was required in the "special circumstances" of
the case, even though "the mandatory requirement of the Sixth
Amendment regarding right to counsel does not apply to indigent
movants under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." Id. at 446.
District Judge East declared that the remand was "tantamount to
a direct command to me to order a member of the bar of this court
to represent Dillon throughout a rehearing of his § 2255 civil proceed-
ing." Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487, 495 (D. Ore. 1964), rev'd,
346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). The
court appointed an attorney who so represented Dillon, and then,
at the court's suggestion, petitioned for reasonable compensation.
The lawyer alleged that "his services, office, and out-of-pocket expense
have been commandeered and taken by the government" and claimedjust compensation under the fifth amendment. 230 F. Supp. at 490.
Judge East, finding that the order to the attorney to represent the
indigent prisoner was a "taking" for a public use and was compens-
able, entered judgment against the United States. This public burden
"in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487, 493 (D. Ore. 1964), rev'd,
346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 819 (1968).
10 CJA(d).
11 D. OAxs, THE CRnvIMNAL JUSTICE ACT IN TnE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS,
A REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. COM-
MITTEE TO IMPLEMENT THE CRIINAL JUSTICE ACT OP 1964 AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IMI-36 (1967) [hereinafter cited as OAKS RE-
PORT III]. See text accompanying note 14 infra.
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certainly make for an easily administered standard. But the premise
rests on factual assumptions of doubtful probity and permanence.
Even before provision was made for some compensation to court
appointed counsel, the most widely felt abuse of the assignment sys-
tem was the false claim of indigency to obtain free counsel. 1 2 False
claims persist, as illustrated by the following examples.1 3 A South
Dakota defendant for whom counsel had been appointed upon his
affidavit showing no property was later found to have two homes,
cattle, and ranch land that he had leased. A Connecticut defend-
ant requested appointment of trial counsel even though he had
about $6,000 in the bank, an unencumbered home worth at least
$25,000, three automobiles, $6,000 in accounts receivable, and his
wife had a mink coat worth $2,500. In a Chicago case, a defendant
who had previously been found eligible asked his court appointed
counsel to secure the court's permission for him to leave the juris-
diction for a trip to Europe. When the defendant was asked where
he could get the money to travel to Europe if he could not afford
counsel, he withdrew his request for the trip.
False claims of need occur for several reasons. Appointed coun-
sel are generally as competent as, and often more competent than,
counsel that the defendant could retain on his own, 14 and many
defendants are aware of this fact. The judge or commissioner is in
a better position to select a good lawyer than the "layman" criminal
who knows little about lawyers and their relative performances in
court. As efforts progress to raise the quality of appointed counsel
above that of the mediocre retained counsel, defendants can be
relied upon less to screen themselves. There are indications that
12 E.g., Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the
Federal District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 579, 585-86 (1963). "In more
than three-fourths of the districts, no investigation of indigency is
conducted other than perfunctory questioning by an official, usually
the judge presiding at the arraignment. If the defendant is without
counsel and claims indigency he is generally believed and counsel is
assigned. Most persons interviewed deplored false claims, but felt
that any extensive investigation of indigency would cost more than
it would be worth."
Some county attorneys in Minnesota complained of "promiscuous
appointment of counsel." Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel
in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48
AmN. L. REV. 1, 19, n.87 (1963).
13 OAKS REPORT III at 28-29.
14 Interview with Carroll W. Brewster, United States Commissioner, in
New Haven, Feb. 28, 1969. Accord, OAKs REPORT III at 37; Timbers,
Judicial Perspectives on the Operation of the Criminal Justice Act of
.1964, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 55, 63-64 (1967); Kamisar & Choper, note 12
supra, at 19. Since the accused knew that appointed counsel would
probably be from the same law firm as retained counsel, the atti-
tude was "might as well let the county pay for it."
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false claims of financial inability have occurred most often in those
districts where a small group of experienced criminal lawyers, the
elite of the defense bar, make up the panel from which counsel are
appointed.15 As defendants come to realize that the truth of their
representations is never investigated except when someone acci-
dentally learns of falsification, and rarely challenged even then, the
temptation to falsify may become irresistible. 16
False claims occur also because some defendants attempt to
manipulate the system, or more objectively, they attempt to obtain
reversal of convictions. One example is the numerous allegations
of ineffectiveness of appointed counsel, the claim of which is prac-
tically unavailable where counsel is retained. 17 Further, any request
for appointed counsel that is denied naturally provides grist for
appeal.' 8
The desirability of preventing abuse from false claims of finan-
cial need relies on considerations other than the amount to be saved
in any one case, the "public treasury" aspect of the problem. Were
that aspect the only concern, then the comment that "any investi-
gation of need would cost more than it would be worth"'9 would be
valid, at least in the short run. What is at stake is perjury or false
swearing in the course of judicial business. These crimes are a
poison to respect for law and public trust in the judicial process,
and if ignored, they can quickly pollute the stream of justice.20
'5 Osxs REPORT I at 32-33.
16 As the CJA is now administered, the criminal penalties for false
swearing or submission of false claims are paper dragons. "We know
of no prosecutions involving CJA affidavits." Id. at 38-39.
17 See e.g., Polur, note 7 supra.
18 In the overwhelming majority of cases where the defendant claimed
he could not afford counsel, and the court found that he could, the
defendant was "playing games." E.g., United States v. Tremont, 351
F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 944 (1966); United
States v. White, 344 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1965) (the official reporters
showed that defendant had always had counsel on appeal. He had
a total of three trials, including his § 2255 hearing); Glenn v. United
States, 303 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 920 (1963);
Davidson v. State, 429 P.2d 1017 (Ct. Crim. App. Okla. 1967).
Whether the defendant has sufficient funds or not, he may play the
game of saying he will retain his own lawyer, then showing up with-
out one, even rejecting the court's offer to appoint counsel, and cry
"denial of the right to counser' on appeal. E.g., United States ex rel.
Davis v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
958 (1968), in which Judge Leibowitz tried tenaciously, but finally
lost the game to the wily defendant and his brother.
19 The comment might well be accurate, and undoubtedly accounts for
the willingness to accept a defendant's word at face value. But it
addresses itself only to the "public treasury" aspect of the problem.
Kamisar and Choper, note 12 supra, at 21-22.
20 OAKs REPORT III at 45-46.
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Moreover, "the impact upon the court of undue imposition upon
appointed counsel, 21 as well as of favoring an accused who well
knows he is not entitled to such counsel, is an unhealthy one-to
say nothing of its undermining the salutary congressional purpose
at the heart of the [Criminal Justice A]ct."22 For these reasons it
is important that the furnishing of defense services be confined to
cases of those who cannot privately afford them.
II. THE BROAD CRITERIA
A. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964
When President Kennedy transmitted the proposed legislation
that became the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 to Congress, he stated
that the purpose of the bill was "to assure effective legal represen-
tation for every man whose limited means would otherwise deprive
him of an adequate defense against criminal charges."23 Under the
CJA counsel must be appointed to represent defendants charged
with felonies or misdemeanors (other than petty offenses as defined
in 18 U.S.C. § 1) "who are financially unable to obtain an adequate
defense." 24 Many considerations may be necessary to unlock the
meaning of these simple words; the key is "adequate."
Each district court was required to place into operation a plan
for the representation of defendants financially unable to obtain an
adequate defense. And each of the judicial circuits was required to
supplement the district plans with provisions for the representation
on appeal of defendants "financially unable to obtain representa-
tion. ' ' 25 No special importance is to be attached to the omission of
the word "adequate" in reference to representation on appeal. In-
deed, the same lawyer generally should represent a defendant
throughout the proceedings "from his initial appearance before the
United States commissioner or court through appeal. '2 6 However,
there is significance in the difference in wording between the CJA
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Neither Rule 44(a),
providing for assigned counsel, nor Rule 5 (b), providing for advice
of the right to counsel, uses the term "financial." Both rules refer
to the right of a defendant "who is unable to obtain counsel." One
21 Some of the complaints about cheating are grounded on the fact
that some defendants who are held eligible are financially able to pay
more than the amount paid under court appointment. Id. at 31.
22 Timbers, note 14 supra, at 57.
23 Letter from President John F. Kennedy to Rep. John W. McCormack
(D. Mass.), Mar. 8, 1963, in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2993.
24 CJA (a).
25 Id.
26 CJA (c). Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty
and the Administration of Criminal Justice 148 (1963).
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may therefore conclude that the right referred to in the rules is
broader than that in the CJA. The rules extend to defendants un-
able to obtain counsel for reasons other than financial.F For exam-
ple, if a financially able defendant were unable to retain counsel
because of the unpopularity of his cause, the court could appoint
counsel and the defendant, rather than the government, could pay
him. The CJA deals with the duty created by financial inability.
B. AvmcNIC BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON Mnummm STANDAimS FOR
CRIVINAL JUSTICE. STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE
SERVICES 28
The fundamental premise of the standards recommended by the
American Bar Association is that representation by counsel is desir-
able in criminal cases from the viewpoints of the defendant and of
society. At the point at which a defendant's payment of a fee to
retain counsel could inflict substantial hardship, society's obligation
to provide counsel arises.
The standard relating to eligibility is as follows:
Counsel should be provided to any person who is financially
unable to obtain adequate representation without substantial hard-
ship to himself or his family. Counsel should not be denied to any
person merely because his friends or relatives have resources ade-
quate to retain counsel or because he has posted or is capable of
posting bond.29
Here again the broad criterion is financial inability to obtain rep-
resentation, i.e., an adequate defense,30 to which is added "without
substantial hardship to himself or his family." The drafters added
that phrase to emphasize that eligibility should not require an
accused to exhaust every financial resource that might be needed
for other vital personal or family necessities such as food, shelter
27 Senator Roman Hruska (R. Neb.) in 1962 introduced a bill to apply
to defendants who were financially able to retain counsel but could
not hire a lawyer because of the unpopularity of their cause. Kutak,
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 44 NEB. L. REV. 703, 714 (1965).
The legislative provision now is unnecessary, in view of the rule.
See 3 C. WRiGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 732 (1969).
28 Hereinafter, ABA PROJECT-DEFENSE SERVICES. Reference here is to
the tentative draft published in 1967. This report, one of a series
on a variety of topics prepared by the advisory committees of the
ABA Project, was approved by the House of Delegates, making it
official ABA policy. Proceedings of the House of Delegates, Chicago,
Illinois, Feb. 19-20, 1968, 54 A.B.A.J. 510, 516 (1968).
29 ABA PROJECT-DEFENSE SERVICES 10, 53.
SO An adequate defense might be thought to encompass more than ade-
quate representation by counsel. Other factors included in the former
concept, such as investigative and expert services, are discussed infra.
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or medicine. 81 The commentary also points out that no dollar
standard of income or assets can be established that will serve the
purpose.3 2
C. UNIFORM DEFENSE OF NEEDY PERSONS ACT (MODEL) 1966
The Uniform Law Commissioners' Defense of Needy Persons
Act83 provides that a needy person is entitled:
to be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person
having his own counsel is so entitled; and, to be provided with
the necessary services and facilities of representation (including
investigation and other preparation).34
The attorney, services and facilities, and court costs are to be pro-
vided at public expense to the extent that the person, at the time
his need is determined, is unable to provide for their payment with-
out undue hardship. Section 4 sets forth some specific factors that
the court may consider in determining the extent of financial need:
income, property owned, outstanding obligations, and the number
and ages of the defendant's dependents.
The three broad criteria with which we are dealing, then, are
substantially the same: financial inability to obtain an adequate
defense (CJA), financial inability to obtain adequate representa-
tion without substantial hardship to defendant or his family (ABA
Project-Defense Services), and "needy person" as one who is un-
able, without undue hardship, to provide for the full payment of
an attorney and all other necessary expenses of representation
(Uniform Act § 1 (3)).
To make these abstractions meaningful, a traditional examina-
tion of decisions will be made initially. To project policy, some
considerations from experiences under the CJA shall then be
presented.35
31 ABA PROJECT-DEFENSE SERVICES 54.
32 Id. at 53. The resources of friends or relatives and the posting of bail
are factors considered infra.
33 Quoted in full at Appendix E, ABA PROJEcT-DEFENSE SERVICES 78
[hereinafter UNIFOmW ACT]. The Uniform Act has not been adopted by
any jurisdiction. Its value for present purposes is merely for compari-
son of broad definitions.
34 UNIFORm ACT § 2.
35 Experience refers mainly to that in the United States District Courts
for the District of Connecticut and for the Southern District of Florida.
The author was law clerk to Senior Judge Emett C. Choate in the
Southern District of Florida from 1966-68. Information concerning
the District of Connecticut was gleaned from interviews with Chief
Judge William H. Timbers and United States Commissioner Carroll W.
Brewster, and from attending preliminary proceedings conducted by
the latter, during the months of February and March, 1969.
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III. INDIGENCY
A. STRcTLY CONSTRUED
In the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries public
financial aid was extended under statutes generally couched in
terms of poor or indigent persons. Those terms were technically
construed as practically synonymous with destitute, denoting ex-
treme want and helplessness. 6 The word indigent meant "the
needy, the poor, those who are destitute of property and the means
of comfortable subsistence,"37 or "that class of persons who are so
destitute and helpless as to be dependent for their support upon
public charity."38
How destitute must a defendant be to be classified poor or indi-
gent? "Less than $25 worth" was the answer of one court. In a 1936
case co-appellants filed affidavits seeking to be declared "poor per-
sons" so they could obtain a free transcript. One was held not to
qualify because he owned an automobile worth $25, which would
have been enough to compensate the court stenographer.39 The
other appellant stated in his affidavit that he had no money or other
property with which to pay the reporter, "which language construed
against him might be held to mean that he did have money or prop-
erty for other purposes.140 Moreover, the appellate court assumed
that the two lawyers who represented the appellants had been paid,
since there was no showing that the trial court had been requested
to furnish counsel.
If appellants chose to pay counsel rather than to pay for the
recordation of the evidence, which they now say was so essential
to a proper presentation of the appeal, ... they should not now be
heard to complain that their rights have been prejudiced by the
court's action. 41
36 Juneau County v. Wood County, 109 Wis. 330, 333, 85 N.W. 387, 388
(1901).
37 City of Lynchburg v. Slaughter, 75 Va. 57, 62 (1880). See also Weeks
-v. Mansfield, 84 Conn. 544, 549, 80 A. 784, 786 (1911) [distinguishing
between insane indigents (defined as above) and insane paupers (pub-
lc charges) in interpreting a will and a statute].
38 This phrase is from Risner v. State ex rel. Martin, 55 Ohio App. 151,
157, 9 N.E.2d 151, 154 (1936), wherein the engrossing story is told of
Mexico Shepherd, his wife, their eight children, and his wife's brother.
The statute being interpreted was Onio GEN. CODE § 2555, providing a
penalty of $50 against anyone who brings an indigent person into a
township. A similar statute is still (or again) on the books. Omo REv.
CoDE ANN. § 5155.29 (Page 1968 Supp.).
39 Shipman v. Commonwealth, 264 Ky. 15, 94 S.W.2d 32 (1936). It also
appeared from "certain statements in brief.., that [appellant] had
real property to the extent of $1,000." Id. at 18, 94 S.W.2d at 34.
40 Id. at 19, 94 S.W.2d at 34.
41 Id. A man earning $110 to $115 per month in 1938 had no right to
prosecute a civil action before a jury without prepaying jury fees
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B. LIBERALLY CONSTRUED
There were some notable exceptions to this type of strict or
technical interpretation of indigency. Well in advance of the CJA
and the other broad criteria here being considered, some cases
pointed out that a litigant need not be absolutely destitute to enjoy
the benefit of statutes authorizing citizens to prosecute or defend
actions in forma pauperis.
In Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Company,42 an affidavit
was held sufficient that stated that the applicant could not pay the
costs of appeal and still be able to provide himself and dependents
with the necessities of life. Justice Black pointed out that the bene-
ficiaries of the statute need not be in the category of public charges.43
Some state courts recognized that indigency-type statutes cannot
require absolute destitution. Florida has a rather strictly worded
statute for forma pauperis appeals. It provides that the county shall
pay the costs of appeal for a defendant "utterly unable to pay the
costs of the cause" who establishes that he has "no property or
other means of payment. '44 A defendant together with his wife
owned a $1900 house, with a $600 mortgage with $25 monthly pay-
ments; owned a $25 car; earned $25 a week and his wife earned $25
a week; paid a finance company $22 a month; and had three de-
pendent children. His son-in-law had paid his attorney fees. The
court, ordering the costs of appeal to be paid by the county, held
that the defendant, though not absolutely penniless, was neverthe-
less unable to pay the costs of appeal.
The idea that those unable to pay their way are thereby deprived
of a hearing in this court so offends our sense of justice, that we
must take care that we do not reach such a result in close cases
by an overly strict requirement of proof under the statute.45
Another Florida case under the same statute, which was "to be
liberally construed so as to accomplish the legislative intent and
not to complicate or impair the constitutional and statutory right
under a California forma pauperis statute. He was not "destitute of
property" and therefore not an indigent person. Alexander v. Superior
Court, 29 Cal. App. 2d 538, 84 P.2d 1061 (1938). This result was not
unfair, for in 1938 a $110 monthly income was adequate for this
purpose.
42 335 U.S. 331 (1948).
43 Id. at 339, referring to the statute providing for proceedings in forma
pauperis, now 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
44 FLA. STAT. §§ 924.17, 939.15 (1967) (emphasis added).
45 Loy v. State, 74 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 87
So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1956).
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of appeal,"46 held that the head of a family is not required to sub-
ject the homestead or the reasonable furnishings of a family home
to sale or pledge to provide the costs of appeal.
47
Determination of indigency as used in connection with the indi-
gent insane has been more liberal than in the legal assistance area.
"To be indigent does not mean that a person must be a pauper. An
insane person with insufficient estate to pay for his maintenance
in the Hospital for the Insane, after providing for those who could
claim his support, is indigent within the terms of the [applicable
statutes] .",48
C. IwDiGENCY REJECTED
These notable examples of flexible or liberal interpretations of
indigency were, as previously stated, exceptional. The more usual,
strict definitions resulted in a rejection of that term in drafting the
CJA and the other criteria here under study. In a letter to the
President transmitting the bill, Attorney General Kennedy stated
that "[t]he term 'indigency' is avoided because of its implication
that only an accused who is destitute may need appointed counsel
or services."49 The Attorney General's Committee found the con-
cept wanting also because it tends to confuse the question of the
right to be provided counsel with other issues about eligibility for
receipt of public welfare assistance, and because it suggests a rigid
standard for every defendant without regard to the cost of obtaining
legal services for a particular case.50 The Report of the Attorney
General's Committee had an impact on eligibility for public legal
46 Gaston v. State, 106 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958), paraphrasing
from State ex. rel Chency v. Rowe, 152 Fla. 316, 321, 11 So. 2d 585,
587 (1943).
47 Gaston v. State, 106 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958). The court also held
that it must assume, "however incongruous it may seem," that defend-
ant derived no income from the lottery activity he was convicted of
having engaged in, since it was that conviction he was seeking to test
on appeal. Id. at 623.
48 Depue v. District of Columbia, 45 App. D.C. 54, 59 (1916); accord,
Weeks v. Mansfield, 84 Conn. 544, 549, 80 A. 784, 786 (1911); Goodall
v. Brite, 11 Cal. App. 2d 540, 549-50, 54 P.2d 510, 515 (1936) (citing
several cases regarding the indigent insane and applying the same
definition to "indigent" where used in connection with admissions to
county hospitals).
40 Letter from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to President John F.
Kennedy dated Mar. 6, 1963, in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2995.
50 THE CRaNAL JUSTiCE BIL: TEXT AND CommENTARY, REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL's COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADmNISTRATION
OF CRiMNAL JUSTICE 40, 41, 147 (1963).
48 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 49, NO. 1 (1969)
assistance, even before the enactment of the CJA,51 which was
drafted for the most part by the Committee.
52
In Hardy v. United States,53 Justice Goldberg said in a concurring
opinion:
Indigence "must be conceived as a relative concept. An impov-
erished accused is not necessarily one totally devoid of means."
Attorney General's Report, at 8. An accused must be deemed indi-
gent when "at any stage of the proceedings [his] lack of means...
substantially inhibits or prevents the proper assertion of a [particu-
lar] right or a claim of right." Ibid. Indigence must be defined
with reference to the particular right asserted. Thus, the fact that
a defendant may be able to muster enough resources, of his own
or of a friend or relative, to obtain bail does not in itself establish
his nonindigence for the purpose of purchasing a complete trial
transcript or retaining a lawyer. 54
State v. Rutherford55 shows a similar influence from the Attor-
ney General's Report. The court there said:
Indigence is a relative term, and must be considered and meas-
ured in each case by reference to the need or service to be met or
furnished.... T]he term does not and cannot, in keeping with
the concept of equal justice to every man, mean absolute destitu-
tion or total insolvency. Rather, it connotes a state of impoverish-
ment or lack of resources on the part of a defendant which, when
realistically viewed in the light of everyday practicalities, sub-
stantially and effectually impairs or prevents his procurement of
an adequate statement of facts and transcript necessary to a com-
plete appellate review of his claims of error.56
Thus the content of the word indigent has evolved in keeping
with changing concepts about equal protection. The word itself is
now to be abandoned as it concerns eligibility for publicly financed
legal assistance, and other phrases will contain the evolving mean-
51 The CJA was enacted Aug. 20, 1964. Its effective date was, at maxi-
mum, one year thereafter, within which time district courts and courts
of appeals were required to place their plans into operation. Pub. L.
No. 88-455, § 3, 78 Stat. 552, 554.
52 Compare THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, REPORT
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINIs-
TRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 145 (1963) with the CJA.
53 375 U.S. 277 (1964) (decided Jan. 6) (establishing the right to a free
transcript of the entire trial proceedings to aid defendant's counsel in
obtaining leave to appeal in forma pauperis).
54 Id. at 289 & n.7 (concurring opinion).
55 63 Wash. 2d 949, 389 P.2d 895 (1964) (decided Mar. 5).
55 Id. at 953-54, 389 P.2d at 898, citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Ne-
mours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948) (discussed at text accompanying note
42 supra); Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Hardy v. United
States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964); and REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMITTEE, note 52 supra, at 7, 8.
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ing.57 The various CJA plans adopted by the district courts and
courts of appeals do not set any more detailed standards than
"financial inability to obtain counsel," but many of them specifically
reject indigency.58
IV. ARE GUIDELINES NECESSARY?
There is some disagreement as to whether the plans, or the prac-
tices within different localities, should be governed by narrower
standards. Although recognizing the variation in conditions and
facilities that exist among the numerous federal districts, the com-
mittee to implement the CJA found that the determination of finan-
cial inability should be treated uniformly on a national basis. The
Judicial Conference has rulemaking authority under CJA (g), but
declined to use it initially, awaiting a demonstration of need for
some express or general direction resulting from the operation of
the various plans. 9
57 Perhaps because some suggest that the correlate of indigency is
charity, it may be presently considered a faux pas in some circles to
use indigency interchangeably with financial inability. Report of the
Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D. 389,
397 (1967).
"Indigent" is nonetheless used in informal reference to defendants
under the CJA. The legislative history of the CJA sketched in
1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2990-91, shows the persistence of
the word "indigent," even though "financially unable to retain counsel"
is the standard.
58 For example: Nebraska-"The term Tmancial inability,' as considered
for the purposes of this plan, does not mean indigency." Kutak, The
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 44 NEB. L. REv. 703, 743-45 (1965). The
plan for the Southern District of Florida and that of the Southern Dis-
trict of California state: "Financial inability to secure counsel shall be
determined by a judge or U.S. Commissioner in a judicial inquiry.
The defendant's representation shall be under oath. Indigency is not
the test." Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States on the
Criminal Justice Act, 36 F.R.D. 277, 354 (1965) [hereinafter, Report,
36 F.R.D.]. The proposed plans for the Southern District of California,
the Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of Louisiana,
the District of Maryland, the Western District of Texas, and the East-
ern District of Michigan, are found in appendix 2 to Report, 36 F.R.D.
at 350.
The point is reiterated in Timbers, The Criminal Justice Act: A
Lawyer's Call to Duty, 39 CoNN. B.J. 427, 432 (1965); Carter & Hauser,
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 36 F.R.D. 67, 68 (1965).
59 Report, 36 F.R.D. at 288. The Committee recommended that uniformity
be promoted by the use of standard forms prepared by the Adminis-
trative Office.
The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 18, 1964, p. 10, col. 4-5, criticized
the CJA's failure to define closely those persons eligible for help. See
also Stifler, Determining the Financial Status of an Accused, 54 ILL.
B.J. 868, 869 (1966): "Proper resolution of [the definition of indigency]
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Professor Dallin H. Oaks, chairman of a committee of the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States and the Justice Department to
recommend amendments to the CJA, concluded that nine guidelines
with suggested commentary, set forth in his report, should be pro-
mulgated. Illustrative of the guidelines is the following elaborate
definition of financial inability:
A defendant is "financially unable to obtain counsel... investi-
gative, expert or other services necessary to an adequate defense"
when the value of his present net assets and the value of his income
expected prior to the anticipated date of the trial (or filing of
appellate briefs, if the determination is for purposes of appeal) are
insufficient, after he has provided himself and his dependents with
the necessities of life, to permit him to retain a qualified lawyer,
obtain release on bond, and pay the other expenses necessary for
an adequate defense at the prevailing rates for the charged offense
in that district.60
Subsection (g) of the CJA provides that the Judicial Conference
may issue rules "governing the operation of plans." It is likely that,
like Internal Revenue regulations, guidelines might come to be
rigidly applied despite the variety of factual circumstances of cases
and the variety of economic differences across our country. No par-
ticularized standard to be mechanically applied should replace the
sound judgment of an experienced trial judge.6 1 However, a new
Judicial Conference subcommittee has been appointed "to prepare
suggested guidelines in the Administration of the Act for the use
of judges, clerks of court and commissioners."6' 2 If they are adopted,
it is hoped that they will not be in such form as to "govern" inflex-
ibly. The broad tests were intentionally formulated to allow lati-
tude; this policy should not be sacrificed in the name of nationwide
uniformity.
V. SPECIFIC FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED
There are several elements and recurring circumstances about
which some general policies can be recommended toward achieving
the broad criteria.
seems indispensable to an effective implementation of the constitu-
tional mandates of the Supreme Court." Stifler points out that prac-
tices for determining indigency vary even within counties in a single
state. Id. at 870.
60 OA s REPORT III at 89.
61 Of course scholars and textwriters can and should criticize, point out
repercussions of decisions, and highlight considerations to be given
weight by the courts in applying the broad standards.
62 Oaks, Improving the Criminal Justice Act, 55 A.B.A.J. 217, 222 (1969).
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A. CRmU CHARGM AND USUAL FEES IN LOCALITY
The theoretical standards of eligibility must in every case be
tied to the costs of a defense for the crime charged, which varies
substantially from district to district or from city to city. A de-
fendant might require financial assistance in a kidnapping or bank
robbery case, where counsel may be quite expensive, but be able
to finance his own defense in a "routine" automobile theft charge.
The judge or commissioner should be and generally is familiar
with the fees customarily charged by counsel who are qualified to
conduct a defense to the particular charges. In all cases, the antici-
pated cost of defense should be the cost of a trial. A defendant
should not be denied appointment of counsel and an opportunity
to have assistance at trial on the ground that he has enough re-
sources to finance his own guilty plea.63
B. INCoNM, CASH, AND DEPEmENTs
Although there is disagreement about the difficulty in general
in determining the ability of an accused to afford counsel,64 the
information most easily obtained concerns defendant's income, his
cash on hand, and the number and special circumstances of his
dependents, which includes such items as medical requirements.
These factors are readily within the knowledge of the accused65 and
easily evaluated by a judge or commissioner who lives in the area,
knows its economic realities, and is familiar with the fees usually
charged by lawyers in cases similar to that of the defendant.
63 See generally OAKS REPORT II at 6, 90-91. If a defendant with ap-
pointed counsel does plead guilty, and is able to pay the consequently
lower compensation due the attorney, an excellent opportunity is
presented for the utilization of the redetermination and part payment
provisions of CJA (c) and (f), or other applicable statutes.
64 Timbers, note 14 supra. For example, Charles H. Carr, District Judge,
U.S. Dist. Ct., Cent. Dist. Calif., said: "The appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants does not present substantial problems since the
act is usually liberally construed and, where there is any doubt, a
defendant is supplied counsel." Id. at 67. Robert A. Ainsworth, Circuit
Judge, U.S. Ct. App., 5th Cir., formerly District Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct.,
E. Dist. La. is in accord. Id. at 69. But William H. Timbers, Chief Judge,
U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Conn., finds difficulty resulting from the ex parte
disclosure of the facts by the accused, and from the speed with which
the determination must be made at the critical early stage of the
proceedings. Id. at 56.
05 Questions concerning salary or number of dependents are more easily
resolved, possibly by a telephone call, than some others. For this
reason the accused is likely to be truthful.
A recommendation concerning upgrading the reliability of this
information is discussed infra.
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The amount and regularity of income or salary are, of course,
major considerations. An analysis, supplied by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, of 52,992 financial affidavits of
defendants for whom counsel were appointed shows that 32 per
cent or 16,846 of them were employed. Most (13,789) of these
defendants had weekly earnings of less than $100, but 113 earned
$200 or more a week. 66
A $200-a-week income may not preclude a determination of
financial inability, but the salary of an internal revenue agent might
show his request for assigned counsel unjustified.6 7 Carroll W.
Brewster, United States Commissioner, commented that if an ac-
cused's income exceeded Brewster's own, he would find against
financial inability to retain counsel.68
Twenty-five per cent of the defendants for whom counsel were
appointed under the CJA had cash on hand or in banks. Most
(10,651 out of 13,035) of these defendants had less than $100.6
About one-half of the defendants for whom counsel were appointed
had dependents; the average number was three.70
Obviously, these factors are relative and should be weighted
along with other circumstances. They are especially important,
however, in determining whether a defendant should be required to
defray part of his legal expenses, under CJA, section (f).
C. REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 71
The major problem here, over and above the sparsity of accurate
data as to the accused's interest in real or personal property, is the
66 The unpublished analysis was supplied by the Administrative Office
in a letter from Edward V. Garabedian, Budget Officer, to the author,
Feb. 24, 1969. The percentages published for 1968 (in the Annual
Report), based on 10,966 financial affidavits (apparently a sampling)
showed a corresponding 68 per cent unemployed. The same corre-
spondence in percentages carries through with cash on hand or in
banks, and real or personal property. Administrative Office of United
States Courts, Annual Report of the Director 1-13, 14 (1968). 25,334
orders appointing counsel under the CJA were received by the Admin-
istrative Office during fiscal 1968, compared with 24,132 during fiscal
1967. Id. at 1-12.
67 Wallace S. Gourley, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct., W. D. Pa., so found.
Timbers, note 14 supra, at 71.
68 Interview in New Haven, Feb. 28, 1969.
69 Unpublished analysis cited note 66 supra.
70 Id.
71 The analysis of 52,922 financial affidavits of defendants for whom coun-
sel were appointed showed that 8,429 or 16 per cent of them had real
or personal property (automobile, furniture, etc.) or both. Note 66
supra.
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difficulty of assessing its worth in terms of ability to pay counsel.
How, for instance, should a judge or commissioner evaluate a de-
fendant's ownership of: thirty-six coonhounds, one of which, ac-
cording to the defendant, was a triple champion that could be worth
between $5,000 and $8,000;72 a Cadillac automobile;7 3 a business car;
real property other than his home;74 "part of a lot partly paid for
which was worth about $1,500 and which was subject to a debt of
about $500? ' ' 75
Assuming the practical accuracy of the data concerning real and
personal properties, the commissioner or court should consider their
liquidity and necessity to meet the basic needs of the defendant and
his family. Securities with a readily available market should be
classified almost like cash. If the asset is a luxury item it would be
reasonable for the defendant to be required to sell it to meet all or
part of his legal expenses.
D. RESOURCES OF ACcUSED'S FRIENDS OR FAMILy
As the Supreme Court of Florida pointed out in 1918, the proper
inquiry is not "what the prisoner's supposed friends have the abil-
ity to do in paying said costs, or their readiness or willingness to
pay them, but has the defendant himself personally the financial
or property ability to pay them or secure their payment. '76 Some
states, however, require that a convicted person show not only that
he is lacking in funds, but also that his friends and relatives are
72 United States v. Bradwell, 295 F. Supp. 958 (D. Conn. 1968), ajfd, 388
F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1968), the story of which is told in some humorous
detail by Chief Judge Timbers, note 14 supra, at 58, 59. The defendant's
counsel later said that Bradwell gave the $8,000 assets away between
the time of the district court proceedings and his motion before the
court of appeals for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, because he
could no longer afford to feed them. Id. at 59 & n.9.
73 Judge Ainsworth reported that the only case in five years as a district
judge in which he experienced much doubt as to a defendant's inabil-
ity to obtain counsel was where the defendant owned a Cadillac. He
found, however, that the vehicle was heavily mortgaged and that the
defendant had no other assets, so counsel was appointed. Timbers,
note 14 supra, at 69.
74 Senior Judge Choate indicated that he would not turn down a request
for counsel on the basis that the defendant owned a car used in busi-
ness, but would weigh defendant's ownership of real property other
than his home against a claim of financial inability. Letter from Senior
Judge Choate to Taylor Mattis, Mar. 6, 1969.
75 A determination, without obtaining more information than this, that
the defendant was not a pauper for the purposes of assignment of
counsel, was erroneous. State ex rel. Barth v. Burke, 24 Wis. 2d 82,
128 N.W.2d 422 (1964).
76 Swilley v. State, 76 Fla. 178, 174-75, 79 So. 715, 715 (1918).
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unable to finance an appeal.7 7 The problem will rarely come up if
friends or relatives are indeed willing and able to pay an accused's
attorney fees or other legal expenses. The accused will simply tell
the judge or commissioner that he has made his own arrangements.
The issue is raised when a showing is required that no friends or
relatives are able and willing to pay. The view expressed by the
Florida court is much preferred, and generally prevails.7 8
The judge or commissioner should inquire as to the resources
and willingness of parents, where a minor is the accused, however,
and of a husband, where a wife is the accused. These classes of
relatives are singled out, not on any basis of legal obligation to the
accused, but because the authority relationship is likely to be much
closer within them. Parents must be notified when a minor is
charged with crime, and they may wish to select counsel for the
child. Moreover, parents might recognize their moral obligation if
encouraged by a judge to do so. The same is true, albeit to a lesser
extent, with husbands and wives. Of course, if these relatives refuse
to pay, or when other circumstances indicate, counsel should be
appointed even though they are financially able, if the accused him-
self is financially unable.
An instance of circumstances other than parental ability or wil-
lingness to pay occurred before Commissioner Brewster when a
twenty-year-old college student was arrested in New Haven for a
draft violation pursuant to a warrant issued out of the Southern
District of California, the boy's home. The boy at first said his
parents had retained or would retain counsel in California. He then
said he did not need a lawyer anyway. Upon gentle but persuasive
advice that he did,7 9 he said he wished to have local counsel fur-
77 Stifler, Determining the Financial Status of an Accused, 54 ILL. B.J.
868, 875 & n.38 (1966). Constitutional objections, noted by Stifler at
876, and the general liberalizing trend will probably obviate such re-
quirements. See generally, Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 607 (1950).
78 The American Bar Foundation's survey found that resources of
friends and relatives are usually considered only if the defendant is
a minor, ABA PROJECT-DEFENSE SERVICES 54, and then some courts
recognize that the parents have no legal obligation to provide a lawyer.
Rastralli v. State, 76 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1954); Lawrence v. State, 76
So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1954). Contra, State v. Hill, 239 Iowa 675, 32 N.W.2d
398 (1948) (involving transcript on appeal), and other Iowa and
Indiana cases cited by Stifler, note 77 supra, at 875 & n.39.
The ultimate in ignoring parents' resources may have occurred in
a Philadelphia case in which the court appointed CJA counsel for a
defendant whose father was a lawyer. OAKS REPORT III at 16.
79 Among other decisions, the accused had to choose whether to plead
guilty in New Haven, or to return to California for arraignment, since
only in California could he plead not guilty.
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nished. He had a guitar, and a $150 check that he was to use to fly
home for the Spring holidays. The commissioner said he would
assign counsel to assist the accused locally. The "other circum-
stances," distance from his parents, need for immediate, competent
legal advice, since there were indications that the boy had been
following advice of doubtful quality from a non-legal source, and
the obvious confusion of the superficially suave accused, made the
offer to furnish local counsel judicious, regardless of the minor
defendant's parents' financial responsibility.80 However, even in
these "special circumstances" the assets of the parents should later
be called upon for the purpose of reimbursement "on behalf of"
the minor.81
E. BAIL
The reaction to defendant's ability to raise bail has varied from
those courts who dismissed it as irrelevant to those who view it as
decisive.8 2 The withholding of assignment of counsel to all persons
who raise bail certainly is an easily administered device, and at the
same time it deters false claims of indigency. However, arguments
that the posting of bail is not conclusive against the claim of finan-
cial inability are more persuasive. The bond premium may have
been provided by friends, relatives, or employers who are unwilling
or unable to pay for counsel. Under the Bail Reform Act of 1966
many defendants are now released on their personal recognizance
or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond.83 Use of
the accused's own funds for bail may have rendered him financially
unable to retain counsel. The chief objection is that the rigid bail
80 Accord, OAxs REPORT III at 17-18: '"Because of the special problem of
the non-resident juvenile and the delays and administrative difficulty
entailed in determining the income and resources of parents and try-
ing to force them to furnish counsel where they are obligated by state
law to do so, we recommend that in determining the eligibility of ajuvenile, the court or commissioner look only to the juvenile's own
income and resources, and ignore, for the present, the income and
resources of his parents or other persons who are obligated to support
him."
81 CJA (f). See generally OAKs REPORT MI at 16-19, 85-86, 98-100. The
same applies to a husband's assets where the original determination of
a wife's eligibility was on the basis that the husband's assets were
not readily available for the wife's defense.
82 Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MInqN. L. REv. 1, 18, 28-33
(1963).
The middle ground is taken in the UNFom ACT § 4 (b): "Release
on bail does not necessarily prevent him from being a needy person."
83 18 U.S.C. § 3146. See generally, 3 C. WRiGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PRocEDuPE §§ 761-778 (1969).
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test places the defendant in the dilemma of choosing between hav-
ing counsel and being at liberty pending trial. Arguably, placing
him in this dilemma constitutes a denial of his right to an effective
defense.8 4
Whereas the inflexible test is properly deplored by most critics,
the defendant's payment of a premium to a bondsman or otherwise
raising bail is relevant.8 5 The posting of bail should at least be
treated as a signal for a more searching inquiry into the defendant's
resources. s6 One who has raised bail is more likely to be financially
able to obtain counsel than one who has not. This is true even if
the defendant is released on his own recognizance, for then he may
be able to maintain his job.
Moreover, if a defendant has posted a cash bond from his own
resources, the amount of the bond should be counted as part of his
property in determining eligibility because the deposit will be re-
turned upon the performance of the conditions of release.8 7 Thus,
it is a resource upon which a lawyer could, and likely would, rely
for his fee. If counsel is appointed, or other services are furnished,
such a bail fund should be viewed as a source of reimbursement for
or contribution toward financing the defense.88
F. A PRACTICAL TEST FOR ELIGIBILITY
Commissioner Brewster suggests that where the defendant
wishes to retain counsel, but doubt exists as to his ability to do so,
the defendant should be allowed to try and see how he comes out.
Often attorneys are willing to accept real or personal property as
security for a fee where the client has no ready cash. After the
defendant contacts several lawyers, if he finds none who will repre-
84 ABA PROJECT-DEFENSE SERVICES 55; People v. Eggers, 27 Ill. 2d 85,
188 N.E.2d 30 (1963), wherein failure to appoint a public defender
solely because the defendant had spent $350 for a bail bond was
erroneous.
The dilemma is similar to the one created by the Kentucky court
in Shipman v. Commonwealth, note 39 supra and accompanying text.
85 It is considered a relevant factor in Senior Judge Choate's division,
Southern District of Florida. In Davidson v. State, 429 P.2d 1017 (Ct.
Crim. App. Okla. 1967), a defendant charged with reckless driving and
leaving the scene of an accident, who, inter alia, had "employed a
professional bondsman" at a cost of $500 could not be considered a
"pauper."
86 Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Fed-
eral District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 579, 587 (1963); Stifler, note 78
supra, at 875.
87 Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (a) (3).
88 OAKs REPORT III at 15, 84, 91.
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sent him within his means, he reports to the commissioner who
then assigns counsel.8 9
If this practical test for eligibility is utilized only where the
defendant states that he wants time to retain his own lawyer, and no
further proceedings are held pending his efforts, then no Miranda-
infringing delay would occur. If the test is applied by telling the
defendant that he is not entitled to court appointed counsel, to give
him incentive to try to retain a lawyer, the delay could be detri-
mental in some cases. 0 The relevant guideline proposed by Profes-
sor Oaks for the latter, incentive-giving situation is:
Prior to appointing counsel in a case where the defendant's
eligibility is doubtful and failure to have counsel immediately
will not work to his detriment, the appointing officer may wish to
deny the defendant's eligibility on a provisional basis and for a
few days during which the defendant should seek to retain counsel
with the resources at his command. In such a case, the defendant
should be advised that if he is unable to retain counsel within this
period of time, counsel will be appointed for him but that he will
be required, so far as he is able, to contribute to the expense of
his defense.9 '
VI. PARTIAL INABILITY-THE BORDERLINE CASE
A. ELIGIBILITY PROVISIONS
One of the most important, and operatively most neglected,92
provisions of the CJA deals with the defendant's duty to pay part
of the costs of his defense when he is able to do so. "Whenever the
89 Interview, note 68 supra. Similar procedure is utilized in the Southern
District of Florida. Oaks cites examples of its use in the Southern
District of California. OAKS REPORT III at 23-24, 13, 14.
In People v. Ferry, 47 Cal. Rptr. 324, 330, 237 Cal. App. 2d 880, 887
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965), the defendant's eligibility for a public defender
was shown by what occurred when the defendant attempted to retain
counsel. His property consisted of land subject to probate, and he had
eleven children. One attorney did not want to take a mortgage on
the land in view of the number of defendant's children, a second
attorney refused the case, and a third attorney asked for cash in
advance. This "try and see" procedure can be utilized quickly and
informally, even by telephone calls for the most part, without giving
a sincere defendant the "run around."
Chief Judge Timbers points out that care should be taken not to
foster what the CJA is intended to head off-that is, the complex
examination of the defendant similar to that of a judgment debtor.
And, the actual determination of whether the defendant is financially
able is to be made by the commissioner or judge, not counsel.
90 OAKS REPORT MIT at 23.
91 OAKS REPORT III at 94-95. The comment following the guideline cau-
tions that this practice should not be followed when the severity of
the charges or the need for immediate assistance of counsel is such
that the defendant is likely to be prejudiced by delay in appointment.
92 Oaks, note 62 supra, at 219.
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court finds that funds are available for payment from or on behalf
of a defendant, the court may authorize or direct that such funds
be paid" toward the furnishing of defense services 3 This provision
is a corollary of the CJA's purpose to limit its benefits to persons
financially unable to obtain an adequate defense.
Experience demonstrates that many persons have resources suffi-
cient to defray part but not all of the expenses of their defense.
In order that representation may be furnished to the extent of each
defendant's need, we have proposed that partial payments may be
required and that the statute shall become operative at whatever
stage of the proceedings the accused is found financially unable
to obtain counsel or services necessary to an adequate defense.94
The American Bar Association likewise recommends provision
for partial eligibility:
The ability to pay part of the cost of adequate representation
should not preclude eligibility. The provision of counsel may be
made on the condition that the funds available for the purpose be
contributed to the system pursuant to an established method of
collection.95
Similarly, the Uniform Act states that the court may order a
needy defendant to provide, to the extent that he is able, for pay-
ment for an attorney and other necessary services and facilities of
representation. 8 Judicious use of the marginal eligibility or part
payment provision can avoid a result of high quality representation
to those closer to the extremes of wealth and poverty while those
of moderate means are ignored.9 7
93 CJA (f) (emphasis added). In Wood v. United States, 389 U.S. 20
(1967), on remand, 387 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1967), defendant's request for
appointed counsel had been disapproved and he had stood trial without
counsel. Although the trial court had questioned him and the defend-
ant had filed an affidavit concerning his financial abilities, the record
did not convincingly show that there was adequate inquiry in that
"the trial court should have explored the possibility that petitioner
could afford only partial payment for the services of trial counsel
and that counsel be appointed on that basis as the Criminal Justice
Act permits." 389 U.S. at 21. The cause was remanded for further
inquiry.
94 Letter from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to President
Kennedy, Mar. 6, 1963, in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2994,
2995-96.
95 ABA PROJECT-DEFENSE SERVICEs 55.
96 UroRmVt ACT § 4(c).
97 This result in the analogous area of medical services has received
much adverse comment. ABA PROJEcT-DEFENSE SEavicEs 55, 56.
Accord, Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some
Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 lViNN. L. REv. 1, 23
(1963). See the contrasting opinions of Judge Waterman in United
States ex rel. Davis v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611, 619 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 958 (1968), and Judge Moore, dissenting, 386 F.2d at
621, 628, concerning the "slim pocketbook of the wage earner" and
the retention of a lawyer.
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B. DUTY OF COUNSEL
Appointed counsel should have the duty of reporting to the
court any situation coming to his attention where a defendant ap-
pears to be able to finance a portion of his defense.9 8 A study of the
representation of indigent criminal defendants in federal courts,99
before there was any method for compensation, reported that usu-
ally when an assigned lawyer discovered that the defendant had
funds, he informed the judge, who would authorize him to charge
a reasonable fee, or discharge him and advise the defendant to retain
him or other counsel of his choice.
An ethical problem is seen by Professor Oaks where counsel dis-
covers income or assets that the defendant had fraudulently con-
cealed when he signed the CJA eligibility form. 00 If no criminal
prosecution is initiated on the strength of the lawyer's report, the
problem is ameliorated. Moreover, because the appointed lawyer is
entwined, albeit unwittingly, in the defendant's fraud, he is bound
to report the matter to the court and ask for instructions.
The Nebraska plan provides:
If any information should come to counsel indicating that the
defendant can make payment, in whole or in part, for legal services
or for services other than counsel furnished under this plan, it
shall be his duty to report such information to the Court, so that
appropriate action may be taken.' 0 '
C. CONTROL BY THE CoURT
Whenever any payment is made to court appointed counsel by
or on behalf of a defendant, the arrangements should be closely
under the control of the court. Subsection (f) of the CJA specifies
that except as authorized or directed by the court, no person may
request or accept any payment or promise of payment for assisting
in the representation of a defendant. 10 2 A major purpose for strict
enforcement of this provision is ethical. A court appointed lawyer
should not obtain fees from the public till and at the same time
pressure a defendant or his family for more. Direct payment from
98 Report, 36 F.R.D. at 290. The plan for the Southern District of Florida
so provides, as does that of the Southern District of California. Id. at
350, 358.
99 Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Fed-
eral District Courts, 76 HAv. L. REV. 579, 587 (1963).
100 OAKs REPORT III at 47-49.
01 Kutak, note 27 supra, at 749.
102 Id. at 748, 749 reiterates this requirement.
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private sources is likely to arouse imputations that the appointed
lawyer is receiving double compensation for his services.0 3
VII. DETERMINATION AND
REDETERMINATION OF DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL ABILITY
A. PROVISIONS
One of the advantages in each of the three standards being
studied is the provision for redetermination during the proceed-
ings. 04 If the defendant's complete or partial financial ability is
not revealed until after counsel is assigned, the court has several
choices under subsections (c) and (f) of the CJA. The choices
include authorizing part payment by or on behalf of the defendant
to the appointed counsel, or terminating the appointment and leav-
ing the defendant free to retain his choice of counsel, including the
one originally appointed by the court. If appointed counsel has
already been paid by the United States when the defendant's finan-
cial ability is discovered, the court might order the defendant to
pay sums to the court for deposit into the Treasury as a reim-
bursement.' 05
103 Accord, ABA PROJECT-DEFENSE SERVICES 56. The Judicial Conference
Committee to Implement the CJA views the purpose of the provision
as preventing total compensation to court appointed counsel from
exceeding the maximum permitted by the act. Report, 36 F.R.D. at
290. But see Oaks, Improving the Criminal Justice Act, 54 A.B.A.J.
217, 220 (1969), suggesting some limited situations where the total
compensation that counsel would receive from the defendant and
from the Treasury should exceed the CJA maximum (although the
amount from the Treasury could not exceed the statutory maximum).
This author favors Oaks' suggested means of requiring defendants
to contribute; the method was rejected by the Judicial Conference. Id.
104 ABA PROJECT-DEFENSE SERVICES 56; UNiFORm ACT §§ 2(c), 3(b),
4(a); CJA (c). See also plans for Nebraska, Kutak, note 27 supra, at
746; W. Dist. of Texas, Report, 36 F.R.D. 341, 343; So. Dist. of Fla.,
So. Dist. of Calif., Report, 36 F.R.D. 350, 357.
105 The ABA PROJECT-DEFENSE SERVICES 58, 59, recommends against
requiring reimbursement by the defendant, except on the ground of
fraud in obtaining the determination of eligibility. In contrast the
UxNIoRmv ACT § 8(a) provides for suit to recover from a defendant
for receipt of legal assistance to which he was not entitled.
Professor Oaks' view of the defendant's obligation to reimburse,
in which this writer concurs, falls between the ABA proposal (no
obligation if the defendant originally was eligible) and the Uniform
Act (obligation if resources acquired within three years). He advo-
cates a policy that the court, in proper circumstances, should require
reimbursement up to a short time after the case is finally disposed
of, in the trial court, or on direct appeal if an appeal is taken.
Thereafter, no income or assets acquired by the defendant should be
subject to an obligation to reimburse the Treasury. OAxs REPORT III
at 81.
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If at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal, the court
finds the defendant financially unable to pay counsel whom he had
retained, the court may appoint counsel and authorize payment by
the United States.106 The court could appoint the lawyer originally
retained by the defendant,10 7 or allow him to withdraw and assign
another counsel. In some circumstances, for example if the defend-
ant is in fact attempting to obtain an unwarranted continuance, the
court might do neither, but rather refuse retained counsel's request
to withdraw.
B. WHO DECIDES
There is almost total agreement that the determination of eligi-
bility should be made by a judicial officer. 0 8 Under the CJA (b) the
court or a United States Commissioner appoints counsel if satisfied
after appropriate inquiry that the defendant is financially unable to
obtain counsel. Certainly, the decision for or against eligibility
should not be made by the lawyer to be assigned if eligibility is
found. Counsel should be out of the determination picture, 0 9 unless
he finds out through representation of the assigned client that he is
financially able to pay, in which case he should report the fact to
the judge.
C. MEcHANmcs OF DECISION
Typically in federal courts, the first step in this ongoing process
is that the accused and the arresting agent appear, almost immedi-
ately following arrest, before the United States Commissioner. In
addition to notifying the accused of the pending charge, advising
him of his right to remain silent and his right to a preliminary
hearing, and to the setting of bond, the commissioner advises the
accused fully of his right to counsel. The determination of need for
appointment of counsel is made on the basis of defendant's sworn
106 CJA (c).
107 Kutak, note 27 supra, at 746. The court should not appoint the retained
lawyer who too often discovers that his clients are financially unable
to pay their agreed fee. The CJA should not be used as a reimburse-
ment device for bad debts. Moreover, to allow such abuse would
frustrate the CJA's policy that the court, not defendant, chooses
assigned counsel.
108 ABA PRoJ~cT-D=nSE SERVICES 56. However, Professor Oaks thinks
that the court should be able to delegate the determination of elgi-
bility to some responsible non-judicial court official, such as a clerk or
administrative assistant. OAKS REPORT I at 8, 9, 86, 87. The author is
in disagreement with Oaks because delegation of this function (which
would require'an amendment of the CJA) is not in keeping with the
importance of the decision.
109 Report, 36 F.R.D. 376, 379.
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statement as to his financial status, supplemented by an inquiry of
the defendant by the commissioner or the court as appropriate." 0
The initial decision as to financial ability may be resolved much
more liberally in favor of the accused who requests appointment of
counsel as the decision is by no means final."' This procedure
has the virtue of permitting a case to proceed expeditiously without
getting bogged down in a collateral proceeding akin to an examina-
tion of the accused as a judgment debtor." 2
Reexamination of the accused's need should be made at any time
if the court believes defendant may be financially able to retain
counsel or to make partial payment for representation." 3 Typically
reexamination occurs upon defendant's first appearance before the
court and, in the event of conviction, at the time of sentencing, when
a presentence report is available, showing assets and source of in-
come." 4 This solution, partially at least, meets the criticism that
claims of need are honored too lightly." 5
In the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida,
the Clerk of the Court has provided complete instructions for pro-
cedure by commissioners under the CJA. A defendant appearing
without an attorney is given several options, among which is to
request assignment of counsel and to continue the hearing until
counsel is present. If after full inquiry the commissioner finds that
the defendant is financially able, he informs the defendant that he
may, at any time, request the district judge to redetermine the issue.
If the commissioner finds defendant partially able, he may certify
that defendant now has or can secure a certain sum to apply on his
attorney's fee.
If the defendant elects to proceed before the commissioner, but
is uncertain as to whether he is financially able to employ an attor-
ney in the proceedings thereafter, the commissioner gives him an
affidavit form with instructions to complete it if he later decides to
request appointment of counsel. The defendant then may mail it to
the clerk who transmits it to the judge for appropriate order. Thus
the defendant's initial position vis-A-vis counsel is explicitly not a
final one. So that the record is clear, the commissioner files a certifi-
cate, as to each defendant individually, that he has given defendant
all the required information, advice, and warnings.
110 Timbers, The Criminal Justice Act: A Lawyer's Call to Duty, 39
CONN. B.J. 427, 432 (1965). The arresting agent should contribute any
information he has.
111 Id. at 433; Timbers, note 14 supra, at 56.
112 Timbers, note 14 supra, at 57.
113 Timbers, note 110 supra, at 444; Kutak, note 27 supra, at 746.
114 Timbers, note 14 supra.
115 OAKS REPORT III at 36.
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D. FoRMs
Standard forms prepared by the Administrative Office are widely
if not uniformly used by the district courts in the administration of
the CJA." 6 The extent of necessary inquiry varies with the obvious-
ness or doubt as to the defendant's financial status. It is optional
with the commissioner or the court whether to require the defend-
ant to swear to a brief form of affidavit" 7 or to use the much more
detailed statement on which defendant answers questions as to his
marital status, residence, employment, ownership of real property
(its estimated value, annual income), ownership of other property
such as automobile, debts, stocks, savings bonds, interest in trusts,
and so on."8 Except where clearly inapplicable, use of the longer
form is more prudent. Even if it shows the defendant eligible for
appointment of counsel, funds available for part payment of com-
pensation or expenses might thereby be revealed." 9
E. SUGGESTIONS ON IMvPROVING THE RELIABILITY
OF THE INFORMATION OBTAINED
(1) Pre-Appointment Investigations
Some difficulty has been experienced because of the ex parte
nature of the disclosures on which decision makers must rely.128
Chief Judge Timbers recommends the solution of requiring the
government to furnish the commissioner or the court, at the defend-
ant's first appearance, with a written statement of all pertinent
information regarding the accused's financial status.' 21 Such infor-
mation is readily available to the investigating agency (FBI, IRS,
SEC) and could be set forth as a standard part of the agency's
criminal reference reports which go to the United States Attorneys.
116 They will be referred to hereinafter as, e.g., CJA Form 1. A complete
set of these forms is reproduced in Report, 36 F.R.D. 277, 296-315.
117 CJA Form 1, on which the defendant fills in short blanks as to whether
he is employed, his weekly wages or income, his cash on hand and
in banks, number of dependents, and "property owned." The same
sheet is utilized for the commissioner's (CJA Form 1) or the court's
(CJA Form 2) finding of financial inability and the order appointing
counsel.
118 CJA Form 3a.
"19 See CJA Form 7, Authorization for Distribution of Available Private
Funds.
120 See note 64 supra.
121 Interview with Chief Judge Timbers in New Haven, March 5, 1969.
Judge Timbers' recommendation is set forth in Timbers, note 14 supra,
at 57, 58.
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The United States Attorney's office in the District of Connecticut
apparently has no objection to furnishing the information, which is
sometimes required by the court for other decisions as well, such
as fixing bail, especially in high bail cases, and at sentencing where
a fine may be contemplated.
The time consuming and expensive nature of pre-appointment
investigations is a drawback to their use in every case. Moreover,
where the arrest is not anticipated until soon before it is made, there
would be no time for the investigation. However, the United States
Attorney should ordinarily make available to the appointing author-
ity any information that he has relevant to the defendant's eligi-
bility. Also, the arresting officer may acquire some knowledge on
the subject and he should informally report it to the commissioner
or court.
(2) More Efficient Use of CJA Forms
Professor Oaks suggests a modest measure that might have some
effect in deterring concealment of assets or income. Add, just above
the place for the defendant's signature on the appropriate CJA
forms, a recital to inform the defendant that he is signing under
the penalties of perjury, and cause him to certify his understanding
that false statements will subject him to criminal prosecution.122
A further easily attainable measure would be to furnish the
probation officer with a copy of every convicted defendant's CJA
affidavit, where a pre-sentence investigation is being made. A mere
cross-check of the affidavit against the usually thorough investiga-
tion by the probation officer could reveal many inaccuracies.
A spot check by the Justice Department of a certain number of
CJA affidavits, together with a policy of well-publicized prosecu-
tions for false affidavits that are located, on a principle somewhat
the same as that the Internal Revenue Service uses in auditing a
predetermined number of tax returns, would have a salutary effect
on the care and honesty with which persons execute CJA forms.123
VIII. SERVICES OTHER THAN COUNSEL-
THE ADEQUATE DEFENSE
One of the assumptions of the adversary system is that counsel
for the defense will have at his disposal the tools essential to the
122 OAxs REPORT MI at 44, 87. Before changes are made, the possibility
of coordinating the CJA eligibility forms with the financial informa-
tion that is requested from the defendant on the Bail Reform Act
Forms should be pursued. Id.
123 Id. at 39, 87.
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conduct of a proper defense. Accordingly, counsel for a defendant
who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other
services necessary to an adequate defense in his case (and this
includes a client who has retained as well as one who has appointed
counsel) may request them under the CJA.124 Similar provisions
for supporting services are found in the ABA Project-Defense
Services1 25 and the Uniform Act. 26 However, there are fewer
standards for determining when these services should be authorized
than for when counsel should be appointed. 27 The CJA provision is
used infrequently, apparently because lawyers are unaware of it.2s
The services required to assist counsel are primarily those of
experts in such matters as medicine, psychiatry, accounting, ballis-
tics, bloodstains, fingerprints, translations, and the like. In the
District of Connecticut authorization is routinely granted upon
proper application to have an accused examined by a physician or
psychiatrist and to have the expert testify at the trial upon the issue
of the accused's capacity for criminal intent.129 Handwriting experts
in forgery cases are authorized as a matter of course.1 0
In one case, after the defendant had pleaded guilty and had been
sentenced, counsel filed a form131 applying for authorization to incur
expenses, inter alia, for investigative services to interview the de-
fendant and his parents. Obviously his application not only was
untimely,18 2 but also related to part of counsel's duties. The court
said:
124 CJA (e); Kutak, note 27 supra, at 747; Oaks, Improving the Criminal
Justice Act, 55 A.B.A.J. 217, 218 (1969).
125 ABA PRojEcT-DEFEsE SERVCES § 1.5 at 7, 22-24.
126 UNu ORm AcT §§ 1 (2), 2 (a) (2).
127 Timbers, note 14 supra, at 60.
128 Applications for services other than counsel have been submitted
to the Administrative Office for less than two per cent of the defend-
ants for whom counsel have been appointed. Oaks, Improving the
Criminal Justice Act, 55 A.B.A.J. 217, 219 (1969).
129 Timbers, note 14 supra.
130 Id. In United States v. Tremont, 351 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 944 (1966), decided before the CJA was effective,
the defendant's request for appointment of a handwriting expert at
government expense was denied. The defendant, charged with inter-
state transportation of a 'stolen motor vehicle, failed "to show his
claimed indigency." 351 F.2d at 146. On the other hand, there was
evidence that he had flown from New Jersey to Memphis at least
twice to prepare for trial, that his wife had made plane reservations
for one of his witnesses, that the defendant was purchasing a home
for $15,500 and had refused an offer of $25,000 for it.
131 CJA Form 8.
132 CJA (e) requires prior authorization by the court, except upon a
finding that timely procurement of necessary services could not await
prior authorization, in which case the court, in the interest of justice,
may ratify such services after they have been obtained.
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[F]or the future guidance of members of the bar appointed as
counsel for indigent defendants under the CJA, absent a showing
of special circumstances which make it unreasonable for counsel
himself to handle these ... items, I will not approve similar re-
quests in any future applications. 133
Where investigative or other services are needed, defense counsel
should usually make efforts to obtain from the prosecution the
desired information or evidence, including admissions or stipulations
to establish the facts sought to be proved. 3 4
CONCLUSION
The law has developed criteria of financial inability to obtain an
adequate defense that are flexible and workable. Further definitions
by statutes or rules are unnecessary and could have a negative effect
if applied rigidly. The courts are considering circumstances such as
the crime with which the defendant is charged and the usual fees
in diverse localities, the income, cash and dependents of the defend-
ant, his real and personal property, the resources of his parents or
spouse in appropriate situations, and whether he has been able to
be freed on bail. More extensive use should be made of provisions
for part payment of legal costs by or on behalf of the defendant and
for the reexamination by the court of the defendant's ability as the
case proceeds. The right to the assistance of counsel and to other
services necessary to an adequate defense is a great ideal toward
which society is making considerable progress.
133 United States v. Matthews, 249 F. Supp. 592, 593 (D. Mass. 1966);
accord, Timbers, note 14 supra, at 61. Of course, under CJA (d), court
appointed counsel himself is entitled to compensation for time spent
in interviews and reasonable expenses incurred, if any.
134 The plans for the District of Nebraska, Kutak, note 27 supra, at 747;
the District of Connecticut, the Southern District of Florida, and the
Southern District of California, quoted in Report, 36 F.R.D. at 361,
provide for inquiry regarding such stipulations. This is an expense-
saving device the use of which should be encouraged.
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APPENDIX
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964
[Public Law 88-455, 88th Cong., Aug. 20, 1964]
AN ACT
To promote the cause of criminal justice by providing for the representation
of defendants who are financially unable to obtain an adequate defense
in criminal cases in the courts of the United States
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be
cited as the "Criminal Justice Act of 1964."
SEC. 2 Title 18 of the United States Code is amended by adding imme-
diately after section 3006 the following new section:
§ 3006A. Adequate representation of defendants
(a) CHoICE OF PLN.-Each United States district court, with the
approval of the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in operation
throughout the district a plan for furnishing representation for defendants
charged with felonies or misdemeanors, other than petty offenses as defined
in section 1 of this title, who are financially unable to obtain an adequate
defense. Representation under each plan shall include counsel and investi-
gative, expert, and other services necessary to an adequate defense. The
provision for counsel under each plan shall conform to one of the following:
(1) Representation by private attorneys;
(2) Representation by attorneys furnished by a bar association or
a legal aid agency; or(3) Representation according to a plan containing a combination of
the foregoing.
Prior to approving the plan for a district, the judicial council of the circuit
shall supplement the plan with provisions for the representation on appeal
of defendants financially unable to obtain representation. Consistent with
the provisions of this section, the district court may modify a plan at any
time with the approval of the judicial council of the circuit; it shall modify
the plan when directed by the judicial council of the circuit. The district
court shall notify the Administrative Office of the United States Courts of
modifications in its plan.
(b) APPOINTMENT OF CouNsEL.-In every criminal case in which the
defendant is charged with a felony or a misdemeanor, other than a petty
offense, and appears without counsel, the United States commissioner or the
court shall advise the defendant that he has the right to be represented by
counsel and that counsel will be appointed to represent him if he is finan-
cially unable to obtain counsel. Unless the defendant waives the appoint-
ment of counsel, the United States commissioner or the court, if satisfied
after appropriate inquiry that the defendant is financially unable to obtain
counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent him. The United States commis-
sioner or the court shall appoint separate counsel for defendants who have
such conflicting interests that they cannot properly be represented by the
same counsel, or when other good cause is shown. Counsel appointed by the
United States commissioner or a judge of the district court shall be selected
from a panel of attorneys designated or approved by the district court.
(c) DuRATIoN AND SuBSTiTUTioN OF APPoINTmENTs.-A defendant for
whom counsel is appointed shall be represented at every stage of the pro-
ceedings from his initial appearance before the United States commissioner
or court through appeal. If at any time after the appointment of counsel
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the court having jurisdiction of the case finds that the defendant is finan-
cially able to obtain counsel or to make partial payment for the representa-
tion, he may terminate the appointment of counsel or authorize payment
as provided in subsection (f), as the interests of justice may dictate. If at
any stage of the proceedings, including an appeal, the court having juris-
diction of the case finds that the defendant is financially unable to pay
counsel whom he had retained, the court may appoint counsel as provided
in subsection (b) and authorize payment as provided in subsection (d), as
the interests of justice may dictate. The United States commissioner or the
court may, in the interests of justice, substitute one appointed counsel for
another at any stage of the proceedings.(d) PAYMENT FOR REPREsENTATioN.-An attorney appointed pursuant
to this section, or a bar association or legal aid agency which made an
attorney available for appointment, shall, at the conclusion of the repre-
sentation or any segment thereof, be compensated at a rate not exceeding$15 per hour for time expended in court or before a United States commu-
sioner, and $10 per hour for time reasonably expended out of court, and
shall be reimbursed for expenses reasonably incurred. A separate claim for
compensation and reimbursement shall be made to the district court for
representation before the United States commissioner or that court, and
to each appellate court before which the attorney represented the defendant.
Each claim shall be supported by a written statement specifying the time
expended, services rendered, and expenses incurred while the case was
pending before the United States commissioner or court, and the compensa-
tion and reimbursement applied for or received in the same case from
any other source. The court shall, in each instance, fix the compensation
and reimbursement to be paid to the attorney, bar association or legal aid
agency. For representation of a defendant before the United States com-
missioner and the district court, the compensation to be paid to an attorney,
or to a bar association or legal aid agency for the services of an attorney,
shall not exceed $500 in a case in which one or more felonies are charged,
and $300 in a case in which only misdemeanors are charged. In extraordi-
nary circumstances, payment in excess of the limits stated herein may be
made if the district court certifies that such payment is necessary to pro-
vide fair compensation for protracted representation, and the amount of
the excess payment is approved by the chief judge of the circuit. For repre-
sentation of a defendant in an appellate court, the compensation to be paid
to an attorney, or to a bar association or legal aid agency for the services
of an attorney, shall in no event exceed $500 in a felony case and $300 in
a case involving only misdemeanors.(e) SERVIcES OTR THAN CouNsE..-Counsel for a defendant who is
financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary
to an adequate defense in his case may request them in an ex parte
application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte pro-
ceeding, that the services are necessary and that the defendant is financially
unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel to obtain the
services on behalf of the defendant. The court may, in the interests ofjustice, and upon a finding that timely procurement of necessary services
could not await prior authorization, ratify such services after they have
been obtained. The court shall determine reasonable compensation for the
services and direct payment to the organization or person who rendered
them upon the filing of a claim for compensation supported by an affidavit
specifying the time expended, services rendered, and expenses incurred on
behalf of the defendant, and the compensation received in the same case or
for the same services from any other source. The compensation to be paid
to a person for such service rendered by him to a defendant under this
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subsection, or to be paid to an organization for such services rendered by
an employee thereof, shall not exceed $300, exclusive of reimbursement
for expenses reasonably incurred.
(f) RECEIPT OF OTHER PAYhmNrs.-Whenever the court finds that funds
are available for payment from or on behalf of a defendant, the court may
authorize or direct that such funds be paid to the appointed attorney, to the
bar association or legal aid agency which made the attorney available for
appointment, to any person or organization authorized pursuant to sub-
section (e) to render investigative, expert, or other services, or to the court
for deposit in the Treasury as a reimbursement to the appropriation, current
at the time of payment, to carry out the provisions of this section. Except as
so authorized or directed, no such person or organization may request or
accept any payment or promise of payment for assisting in the representa-
tion of a defendant.
(g) RuLEs Am REPoars.-Each district court and judicial council of a
circuit shall submit a report on the appointment of counsel within its juris-
diction to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in such form
and at such times as the Judicial Conference of the United States may spe-
cify. The Judicial Conference of the United States may, from time to time,
issue rules and regulations governing the operation of plans formulated
inder this section.
(h) APPRoPSiATroNS.-There are authorized to be appropriated to the
United States courts, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, sums necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
When so specified in appropriation acts, such appropriations shall remain
available until expended. Payments from such appropriations shall be
made under the supervision of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts.
(i) DisTRcTs INcLUDED.-The term 'district court' as used in this sec-
tion includes the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the District Court of
Guam, and the district courts of the United States created by chapter 5
of title 28, United States Code.
SEC. 3. Each district court shall within six months from the date of this
enactment submit to the judicial council of the circuit a plan formulated
in accordance with section 2 and any rules and regulations issued there-
under by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Each judicial coun-
cil shall within nine months from the date of this enactment approve and
transmit to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts a plan
for each district in its circuit. Each district court and court of appeals
shall place its approved plan in operation within one year from the date
of this enactment.
SEC. 4. The table of sections at the head of chapter 201 of title 18 of
the United States Code is amended by adding immediately after item 3006
the following:
3006A. Adequate representation of defendants.
Approved August 20, 1964.
